The Military Organization of Bacon’s Rebels

Two reenactors of Bacon’s Rebellion.

Who were Bacon’s Rebels? 

The men who took up arms and swore oaths to obey and fight for Nathaniel Bacon in 1676 came from all ranks of Virginia society, but chiefly from among its lower ranks. They were uneasy men, who had friends and family attacked by hostile Indians, or who experienced their brutality firsthand. They were sick of paying taxes to support a government that could not protect them from their enemies, and then prevented them from protecting themselves. They chafed at a political system that seemed only to benefit the wealthiest planters.  While only two members of the House of Burgesses openly supported Bacon, thousands of small planters, farmers, artisans, traders, servants, and slaves flocked to his banner. Not only white Virginians supported Bacon, but free and enslaved blacks as well. There were even a handful of Indians who joined the rebels, in spite of Bacon’s harsh stance against all Indians. The planter elites of Virginia despised the Rebels, they were the “lowest of the people” according to Governor Berkeley, the “scum of the country” said William Sherwood. But they fought, because they had everything to lose, and they held out for months after Nathaniel Bacon’s death, especially the indentured servants and slaves who joined the rebels to get their freedom. 

 

In Bacon’s Rebellion, white and black Virginians fought side by side.

Military Experience and Quality

The popular view of the Baconite rebels, especially in artistic representations, is of a rabble, a ragged mob, full of ruffians who pilfered as they pleased and terrorized civilians, with their chief act of vandalism being the burning of Jamestown. The Rebels may have been an armed force, but they were certainly not a trained and disciplined one. But our clearest view of the rebels, from Bacon’s armed confrontation with the Governor and Assembly on June 23rd, 1676, shows them in a different light. They were formed in units, which spread out and occupied Jamestown with efficiency. Bacon marched up to the Statehouse with 100 “fusiliers” in two files, well-armed and disciplined. At his command, they cocked their weapons and aimed them at the windows of the Statehouse. In a tense moment when one errant trigger pull could have precipitated a massacre, Bacon ordered them to uncock their weapons and shoulder arms, which they did. This was not the action of a trigger happy mob, but the well-drilled motions of “regular,” even “veteran troops” as Thomas Mathews described them.

Undoubtedly, however, Bacon would have brought his best and most reliable men with him to confront the Governor, and “regular” or “veteran” could not have been an apt description of the rest of the army. Surely some would have had experience soldiering against the Indians or Dutch, possibly serving in some of the wars in Europe. But undoubtedly for the majority of the rebels, if they had any military experience at all it would have come from service in the militia. Governor Berkeley had raised 4,000 militia during the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-74) and kept them in readiness, although they saw no major action. All of Bacon’s men served as volunteers, and were willing to serve as long as it suited them. Nathaniel Bacon set out on his first campaign against the Indians in April, 1676 with 300 men, and returned to Virginia with about half that number. Only a handful of those losses were actual casualties, the rest were men who decided they were done soldiering and went home. And the same happened in August and September when he campaigned against the Pamunkey. Bacon’s force of over 1,000 men was reduced to less than 400, this time due more to the terrible conditions, brutal heat, lack of supplies, camping in the rain, and tramping through fetid swamps. 

Two reenactors carry flintlock muskets with cartridge boxes, while an officer carries a sword and a spontoon (half-pike).

Organization

Bacon’s primary aim in marching on Jamestown in June 1676 was to secure a royal commission as general of Virginia forces. Additionally, he demanded a stack of blank officer’s commissions to fill out his ranks with subordinate officers, from ensign to colonel. A partial list of Baconite officers can be reconstructed from the sources:

• General Nathaniel Bacon
• Colonel Joseph Ingram
• Major Edmund Cheesemen (or Chisman)
• Major Thomas Whaley
• Major (?) Bristow
• Major John Langston (commanding troop of horse)
• Captain Gregory Wakelett (commanding troop of horse, West Point Garrison)
• Captain Thomas Hansford (Yorktown garrison)
• Captain Thomas Wilford
• Captain William Rookings (or Rookman, Bacon’s Castle garrison)
• Captain Arthur Long
• Captain Otho Thorpe (Throp?)
• (?) John Gatlin
• (?) Joseph Rodgers
• (?) John Clements
• (?) William Groves

The infantry company and the cavalry troop were the basic tactical units of 17th Century armies. A typical infantry company in the regular English army would have comprised:

1 Captain

1 Lieutenant

1 Ensign

2 Sergeants

3 Corporals

1 Drummer

60 Privates (Ede-Borrett, pg. 77)

A typical cavalry troop likewise would have comprised:

1 Captain

1 Lieutenant

1 Cornet

1 Quartermaster

3 Corporals

2 Trumpeters

40 Privates (Ede-Borrett, pg. 42)

Bacon’s rebels (as well as Berkeley’s loyalists) would not have departed radically from this structure, with necessary adaptations for fighting in North America. Postemski reckons Bacon’s infantry companies to have comprised about 70 men each, with the horse troops anywhere from 40 to 60 men each (Postemski, et al, pg. 63). But as mentioned above, with the rebels fighting as volunteers and very prone to desert, it would have been impossible to maintain anything like a regulation strength. The sizes of individual units likely varied widely, depending on the conditions of the campaign, the fortunes of war, and the willingness of the men to fight.

 

Reenactor armed with musket and sword, along with a bandolier of powder charges.

When Bacon entered Jamestown on June 23rd, 1676, William Sherwood witnessed the rebel commander “with at least 400 foot… and 120 horse…” These numbers certainly were not the result of numbering each man individually, but from counting the number of flags and estimating the size of individual formations. Applying Postemski’s estimation to Sherwood’s account suggests that Bacon’s army on June 23rd comprised of around 6 companies of infantry and 2 or 3 troops of horse. At other times in July and August, Bacon’s ranks swelled to over 1,000 men, but the exact composition of this force is unknown. When the conflict between Bacon and Berkeley bogged down into stalemate, the Baconite forces occupied fortified garrisons with hundreds of men each, commanded by a captain or higher ranking officer.

A typical English battle flag of the 17th Century, the stars indicating that this is the flag of the fifth captain’s company.

Flags

The “drums, [and] banners” captured by Berkeley loyalists in the wake of the rebellion is sufficient to testify that Bacon’s rebels carried flags. (Rice, pg. 112) These “colors” were important means of both soldiers and commanders to orientate themselves on the field of battle. The task of carrying them would have been entrusted to an ensign in an infantry company, or a cornet in a troop of horse, who were the lowest ranking officers in the company. The colors themselves might have been taken from the militia, or possibly handmade by the wives of the Baconite rebels. In all likelihood the colors were designed similarly to other English military flags of the period, a large square field of a single primary color (black, white, red, blue, yellow, and green were all common), possibly with a St. George’s cross in the canton. Perhaps the flags were adorned with slogans advertising the goals of the rebels, but I have come across no description of any of these flags to say with certainty. 

Uniforms

There is nothing to suggest that the Baconite rebels were distinguished by any kind of uniform coat or color. Rebels and loyalists alike would have been dressed in their civilian clothes, which would have varied according to the soldier’s status and occupation. One must only look at the civilian fashions of the 1670’s to get a picture of Bacon’s rebels.

 

Two reenactors armed with sword and musket, one with a bandolier, the other with a powder horn. The man on the right has a plug bayonet!

Equipment

Likewise, it would have been impossible for the Baconite army to have been uniformly equipped. Officers would have carried their own swords and pistols, sergeants and corporals would carry pole arms (halberds, half-pikes, etc) as usual in the militia and regular army. Private soldiers carried muskets. It was normal for civilians in Virginia to carry firearms both for home defense and militia service. The rebels would have carried their personal weapons with them on campaign, which would have varied widely in caliber and quality, even small caliber fowling pieces. The late 17th Century was a transitional time for weaponry, and even in professional armies —even within the same company— soldiers were equipped with both matchlock and flintlock muskets, also called “fusils”. But Thomas Mathews’ account of the rebellion suggests that Bacon’s rebels were equipped with flintlocks:

“…and after [Bacon] came a detachment of fusiliers (muskets not being there in use) who with their cocks bent presented their fusils at a window… [Later] they sat down their fusils, unbent their locks, and stood still…”

The claim of “muskets (i.e. matchlocks) not being there in use” is a curious one. Does “there” mean the entire colony of Virginia, or simply in Bacon’s army? Or does he mean strictly “there” on the Statehouse lawn on June 23rd, 1676? The question is compelling. At the very least, one can conclude that a significant proportion of Nathaniel Bacon’s men had flintlocks, firearms of the most modern type in his day. Postemski reckons the flintlock to have been “most prevalent” among the combantants on both sides of Bacon’s Rebellion. (pg. 65)

Something missing from the descriptions of Bacon’s army is pikes. European armies, needing protection from enemy cavalry, equipped between a quarter to a third of their infantry with pikes. But in North America, the enemies that Virginians could expect to fight, woodland Indians and marauding Dutchmen, did not attack on horseback. Of the weapons which Governor Berkeley ordered from the London arsenal in 1673, there were cannon, muskets, “horse pistols and sabers,” but no pikes. (Billings, pg. 222) It is not to say that pikes were not available in Virginia, but in most cases their use was unnecessary. 

 

These reenactors represent a troop of horse from Monmouth’s Rebellion, 1685, although they give an idea of how Bacon’s cavalry might have appeared. 

It is known that Bacon’s army included troops of horse. Cavalry in the 17th Century was very costly to equip and maintain, but they were of great value on the battlefield. Service in the cavalry was also more prestigious than service in the infantry. Bacon’s troopers probably comprised the men who were wealthy enough to own their own horses and were able to take care of them, although a number of horses were requisitioned from the unhappy populace during the rebellion. The Baconite horse most likely did not fight as heavy cavalry with helmets and breastplates. But the “horse pistols and sabers” Berkeley ordered for the militia in 1673 show that these weapons were available in Virginia, and Bacon’s men could have been equipped to fight as traditional cavalry. However, Postemski reckons that the Baconite horse fought as dragoons, or mounted infantry, who used their horses to maneuver into action, but then dismounted and fought on foot with muskets and carbines. (pg. 63) Such cavalry was also ideally suited for reconnaissance and launching raids against enemy positions. 

Bacon’s rebels also fielded cannon, which would have been taken from arsenals, fortifications, or from off ships. These would have been near useless in the wilderness fighting against the Indians, but provided good service against Berkeley’s loyalists. More maneuverable field pieces would have been brought into the field, while the “great guns” of larger caliber would have been emplaced at fortified garrisons. (Postemski, et all., pg. 66) At the Siege of Jamestown in September, 1676, Bacon brought up “three large guns” and began bombarding loyalist ships on the river as well as the fortifications protecting the town. This pressure proved decisive in causing Governor Berkeley to evacuate the town.

Engineering

There must have been some knowledge of military engineering, however primitive in Bacon’s army, as they were able to dig trenches and gun emplacements at the Siege of Jamestown, as well as fortifications for their garrisons. A professional military engineer probably would have balked at these constructions, but in the North American context these works could have been formidable indeed. From their entrenchments outside Jamestown, Bacon’s men were able to repulse a direct assault by Berkeley’s loyalists, although this may have been as much a morale failure among Berkeley’s men as it was due to the strength of the Baconite position.

A camp scene during Bacon’s Rebellion.

 

Logistics and Supply

The Baconite rebels suffered from a deficiency of formal logistics and supply. On both of Bacon’s campaigns against the Indians, his men quickly ran out of food, thereafter subsisting themselves on what could be given to them or captured from the natives. Lack of food was a primary reason for desertion, and the men who stuck it out were half-starved by the time they returned to the English plantations. At other times, the chief means which the Baconite rebels used to supply themselves appears to have been requisitions from civilians, especially those whose loyalties lay with Governor Berkeley. This was an accepted means of supply for 17th Century armies, but it was no comfort for the civilians whose homes were pilfered, whose horses and livestock were carried away, only to be given promissory notes that would likely never been redeemed. The amount of weapons, powder, and ammunition captured by the loyalists at the end of the rebellion attest that there was no shortage of those items among the rebel garrisons. How well fed these rebels were is another question, but they surrendered because there was no hope of victory, not because they were starving to death. 

Conclusion

Nathaniel Bacon’s army was no mere rabble, but a formidable volunteer army with a formal command structure. They were armed with modern flintlock muskets, and capable of fielding cavalry and artillery in support. The Baconites at times could show discipline and determination, although they were hampered by a primitive system of logistics and supply. In all these areas, they were comparable to other armies of the period. Their true quality was never seriously tested in battle, but they maintained their cause for three months after Nathaniel Bacon’s death in October, 1676, failing to achieve the goals for which they fought.

Works Consulted

Billings, Warren M. Sir William Berkeley and the Forging of Colonial Virginia. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004. 

Ede-Borrett, Stephen. The Army of James II. Warwick: Helion and Company, 2017.

Mathew, Thomas. “The Beginning, Progress, and Conclusion of Bacon’s Rebellion in Virginia in the Years 1675 and 1676.” Richmond Enquirer (1804). Retrieved at: https://loc.gov.

Postemski, Megan D., Grey, Allyson, et. al. “Mapping the Dragon: An Indigenous History of Bacon’s Rebellion.” St. Mary’s City: St. Mary’s College of Maryland, 2025. 

Rice, James D. Tales from a Revolution: Bacon’s Rebellion and the Transformation of Early America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 

Sherwood, William; Ludwell, Philip. “Bacon’s Rebellion.” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1893). 167-186. 

Soli Deo Gloria!